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DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF INCENTIVE MOTIVATORS
ON WORK PERFORMANCE
ALEXANDER D. STAJKOVIC
University of Wisconsin-Madison
FRED LUTHANS
University of Nebraska
In this field experiment, we first compared the performance effects of money systematically administered through the organizational behavior modification (O.B. Mod.)
model and routine pay for performance and then compared the effects of O.B. Mod.administered money, social recognition, and performance feedback. The money intervention based on the O.B. Mod. outperformed routine pay for performance (performance increase = 37% vs. 11%) and also had stronger effects on performance than
social recognition (24%)and performance feedback (20%).
found a 17 percent average increase in performance.
On the basis of distinct characteristics, such as
outcome utility, informative content, and the
mechanisms through which they operate to control
human action (Bandura, 1986, 1997), the performance-enhancing incentive motivators most frequently used in organizations can be classified as:
(1) money, (2) social recognition, and (3) performance feedback (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997). Although the direct performance impact of each of
these incentive motivators has been documented
(Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Komaki, Coombs, & Schepman, 1996), researchers have yet to examine the
differences in the effects of the various incentive
motivators on performance when they are analyzed
concurrently in the same field setting and when
systematic application procedures are taken into
account.
The purpose of this study was to examine two
research questions: (1) What effect does money (the
most common incentive motivator) have on performance when it is routinely administered as pay for
performance versus systematically applied through
the theory-based steps of the O.B. Mod. model? and
(2) What are the relative performance effects of
money, social recognition, and feedback, when all
three are commonly implemented through the O.B.
Mod. model? Our goal in addressing the first question was to explain why traditionally administered
pay for performance does not always seem to work
and to examine if stronger effects might be realized
through-systematic application, as is offered by the
steps of the O.B. Mod. model. Our intention in
examining the second research question was not
only to show that the same behavior can be regulated by different incentive motivators, but also

Although behavioral management, as a systematic approach to increasing employee effectiveness,
was formulated about 25 years ago (e.g., Luthans &
Kreitner, 1975), organizations are generally not
using contingent incentive motivators to manage
workers' day-to-day task-related behaviors and to
improve productivity (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989;
Ilgen, Major, & Tower, 1994). Moreover, the use of
various incentives to enhance work performance is
mostly ignored or, at best, assumed to be handled
with existing pay, benefits, or year-end profit sharing or bonus plans (Kerr, 1999; Stajkovic & Luthans,
1997).
Among the models proposed within the conceptual framework of behavioral management (e.g.,
Scott & Podsakoff, 1985), the organizational behavior modification (O.B. Mod.) model (Luthans &
Kreitner, 1985) has been frequently used to foster
the effectiveness of various incentive motivators in
different types of organizations (Stajkovic &
Luthans, 1997). Based on the principles of behavior
modification (Bandura, 1969), the O.B. Mod. model
provides a five-step framework for identifying,
measuring, analyzing, contingently intervening in,
and evaluating employees' task behaviors aimed at
performance improvement. In a recent meta-analysis (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997), we examined the
empirical findings over the past 20 years that pertain to the effectiveness of various interventions
when applied through the O.B. Mod. model and
This study was partially funded by a basic research
grant from the Society for Human Resources Management (SHRM)Foundation. The interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations, however, are those of the
authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the
Foundation.
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that different incentive motivators may regulate the
same behavior differently (Bandura, 1986). This
premise is based on social cognitive theory, according to which "human behavior... cannot be fully
understood without considering the regulatory influence of response consequences" (Bandura,1986:
228) and, more specifically, that human action is
better predicted by the content than by the sheer
amount of an incentive motivator (Bandura,1997).
THEORYAND APPLICATIONOF MONEY
We base our study on two basic conceptual premises. First, we argue that the controversy surrounding pay for performance (Gupta & Shaw,
1998; Kerr, 1999; Lawler, 1990; Luthans & Stajkovic, 1999; Pfeffer, 1995) largely reflects an implementation issue and not a question of the incentive
value of money per se. Second, once implementation is held constant through the O.B. Mod. model,
we suggest that commonly used incentive motivators theoretically have different natures and, thus,
different impacts on performance.Given that much
of human agency is rooted in social systems (Bandura, 1999), the relevant literature (Bandura,1986)
suggests that different incentive motivators may
have different performance effects because of their
subsequent outcome utility, informative content,
and the mechanisms through which they operate to
control human action.
The Theoretical Basis of Money as an
Incentive Motivator
The theoretical underpinnings of money are beginning to receive attention (Mitchell & Mickel,
1999). We suggest that the nature of money as a
construct and as an incentive motivator can be
explained through the social cognitive theoretical
dimensions.
Outcome utility. Although monetary incentives
can take several forms (forinstance, tangible prizes,
paid vacations), in organizationscash payments are
the most prevalent generalized monetary incentive
(Rynes &Gerhart,1999). The main characteristicof
all monetary incentives (regardlessof their form) is
that they cost organizations financial resources.
Whereas prizes, and so forth, derive their motivating potential from their actual content, the outcome
utility of money is derived from the fact that it
ultimately leads to some form of tangible payoff
(Bandura, 1986). Thus, the incentive value of
money is based on its exchange function, for it can
be exchanged for most goods, services, and privileges (Bandura, 1986; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997).
As a result, people are attractedto well-paying jobs,
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extend extra effort to perform the activities that
bring them more pay, and become agitated if their
pay is threatened or decreased.
Informative content. The informative value of
money largely depends on whether it is provided
on a fixed (set-amount paycheck) or on a variable
(commission based on sales) schedule. In the
former case, the information conveyed is merely
dichotomous, with its receipt indicating some performance success ("My performance must have
been satisfactory since I received the check") and
vice versa. In the latter case, where different
amounts received indicate different levels of performance,the informativevalue of money increases
to an ordinal level, since it more specifically indicates the magnitude of a potential performancestandard discrepancy. However, in neither case
does money convey much task-relatedinformation
concerning performance effort, information cues
needed, and the content of behaviors.
Regulatory mechanism. In regulatinghuman action, money can have instrumental or symbolic motivational properties. If perceived in its instrumental form, money motivates because it can provide
outcomes that satisfy physiological or psychological needs. However perceived symbolically, money
generates social comparison information, which
can indicate a person's standing regardingpsychological aspirations for valued and desired aspects of
social life (such as status). Logically, there may be
dynamic sequencing in the regulatoryemphasis on
either instrumental or symbolic perceptions. It appears reasonable to induce that symbolic comparisons (perceptions of relative standing) are likely to
dominate an individual's regulatory cognitive process if physiological or psychological needs are
perceived to have been reasonably met for the
present and the future, as would be the case for a
person with high income and/or savings.
Pay-for-Performance Applications

In addition to explaining money's conceptual nature, a theory about money as an incentive motivator needs to also demonstrate how to best implement it for performance improvement. One of the
most common ways in which money has been administered to improve productivity in organizations has been through pay-for-performanceplans
(Durham& Bartol, 2000). Pay for performance has
been defined as "payingindividuals predetermined
amounts of money for each unit produced"
(Lawler, 1990: 57). Despite the frequent use of pay
for performance as an incentive motivator because
of the presumed value of money to employees,
many lingering doubts remain regarding the effec-
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tiveness of this approach (Kerr, 1999; Lawler, 1990;
Pfeffer, 1998). In particular, with but a few exceptions (e.g., Hanlon, Meyer, & Taylor, 1994), most of
the evidence regarding the effectiveness of pay for
performance is based on anecdotal testimonials
and one-time company cases, rather than on methodologically more rigorous empirical studies. This
has resulted in mixed and even confusing evidence
on how, where, and even whether to use pay for
performance to improve performance (Gupta &
Shaw, 1998; Lawler, 1990; Pfeffer, 1998).
The major reason for weak or mixed effects of pay
for performance appears to be in the administration/implementation procedures (Kerr, 1999; Lawler,
1990; Pfeffer, 1995). Specifically, although Pfeffer
noted that "one of the oldest and most reliable
findings in psychology is the principle of reinforcement" (1995: 60), he also stated that the "instability
in reward practices is not related to instability in
underlying principles of human behavior; more
likely, it is caused by... incomplete knowledge of
basic social science...
[and] what we know about
behavior" (1995: 60). Similarly, after an extensive
review of the literature, Lawler (1990) also concluded that process and design problems limit the
effectiveness of pay for performance. He stated,
"What is needed is a set of fundamentally different
approaches to conceptualizing and structuring pay
systems because the traditional practices do not
score well when evaluated against the kind of results that a pay system should produce" (Lawler,
1990: 5). In short, although pay for performance is
meant to improve employee behavior, it is often
aimed at "the wrong behavior" (Lawler, 1990: 58;
cf. Kerr, 1999).
To address these application problems, we propose the use of the O.B. Mod. model to enhance the
effectiveness of pay for performance (for model
details, see Luthans and Stajkovic [1999]). We
propose use of the model because it provides
theory-based, yet application-oriented, specific analytic procedures for the application of key behavioral principles, such as identifying and measuring
critical performance behaviors, functionally analyzing antecedents and consequences, intervening
with contingent incentive motivators, and evaluating performance outcomes. In particular, the application of pay for performance may be greatly
enhanced if task performers have a clear understanding of exactly what behaviors are critically
related to performance and how they will be objectively measured (steps 1 and 2 in the model). Next,
functional analysis (step 3) is needed to determine
what stimulates the occurrence of the critical
performance-related behavior (training) and what
may be impeding it (inadequate or outdated tech-
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nology). The key, action step (step 4) in the model
specifies how to administer the incentive motivator
(money, in this case) so it is contingent upon the
employee doing the identified and measured critical performance-related behaviors. This step also
includes considering the appropriate size of the
reinforcement (for example, the amount of money).
Finally, step 5 of the model is evaluation, which
insures that the money is indeed leading to significant performance improvement. In other words,
the O.B. Mod. model provides design procedures
by which every (according to Wood's [1986] theory
of tasks) critical constituent of a task, such as component identification (identifying behavioral acts),
coordination (sequencing behavioral acts), and dynamic activity (functional analysis of temporal
changes), is taken into account. In view of the
above theory and design procedures, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1. Money, systematically administered using the O.B. Mod. model, will have a
greater impact on employee performance than
will pay for performance routinely administered with no systematic application steps.
NONFINANCIAL INCENTIVE MOTIVATORS
We next address the performance impact of
money as compared to the impact of nonfinancial
incentive motivators. Social cognitive theory is
again used to analyze the nature of social recognition and performance feedback and to derive a hypothesis on the differential effects.
Social Recognition
Outcome utility. Social recognition consists of
personal attention, mostly conveyed verbally,
through expressions of interest, approval, and appreciation for a job well done (Luthans & Stajkovic,
2000). Although social recognition does not have
direct financial costs, it does use managers' time,
effort, and interpersonal skills. Social recognition
derives its outcome utility from its predictive value
and not from the social reactions themselves (Bandura, 1986). Since desired personal outcomes (promotions, raises) are usually preceded by social approval, by reversing the correlates, the positive
reactions of relevant others become predictors of
desired (mostly material) rewards, and thus become incentives for future action. As a result, people will engage in behaviors that receive social
recognition and avoid behaviors that lead to the
disapproval of others (Bandura, 1986; Luthans &
Stajkovic, 2000).
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Informative content. Like money, social recognition does not entail much task-related information that may be useful for subsequent performance
improvement. However, whereas the informative
value of money resides in its amount, the informative value of social recognition resides in the content of what has been delivered and not in its quantity. Showing employees how much their work is
valued through social recognition is not achieved
by frequent noncontingent phrases (such as "Good
job!"), but by expression of genuine personal appreciation for the successful performance. This is
because indiscriminate approval that does not
eventually result in desired benefits becomes an
empty reward, and thus lacks motivating potential.
The indiscriminate approval and genuine recognition with promising outcomes represent the continuum from the dichotomous to the ordinal informative level of social recognition.
Regulatory mechanism. The motivational power
of social recognition is cognitively "operationalized" through the basic human capability of forethought (Bandura, 1986). On the basis of the social
recognition received and, thus, the perception of
desired consequences to come, employees will selfregulate their future behaviors by forethought.
They may plan courses of action for the future,
anticipate the likely consequences of their future
actions, and set performance goals for themselves.
Thus, the future acquires causal properties by being
represented cognitively by forethought exercised in
the present (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Stajkovic & Luthans,
1998b). In other words, the forethought is the selfregulatory mechanism that allows perceived
future outcomes (based on social recognition) to
be cognitively transferred into current action.

Informative content. Even though feedback generally conveys more task information to employees
than either money or social recognition, the level of
information still varies depending on whether outcome or process feedback has been delivered. Outcome feedback refers mostly to conveying to employees discrepancies between their current level
of performance and the desired performance standard. In addition to this information, process feedback includes communicating to the employees
how the performance was executed (the critical
behavioral components for the task), and, importantly, what could be done in the future to improve
the performance (a potentially better sequencing of
behavioral acts, the potential dynamic complexities where sequencing may need to change, and so
forth).
Regulatory mechanism. Feedback regulates behavior through the basic human capability of selfreflection, where the potential feedback-standard
discrepancy is first cognitively evaluated and then
acted upon (Bandura, 1986). After personal standards have been set, incongruity between a behavior and the standard activates self-evaluative reactions, which, in turn, influence subsequent action.
In other words, the self-reflective capability can be
defined as self-reflective consciousness, which enables people to think and analyze their experiences
and thought processes. By reflecting on their experiences, people can generate specific knowledge
about their environments and about themselves.
Thus, performance feedback regulates action by
initiating evaluation through self-reflection of and
stimulating a reaction to the feedback-standard discrepancy.

Performance Feedback

Differential Engagement of Incentive Motivators

Outcome utility. Although performance feedback can be conveyed in a variety of different forms
and ways, it usually refers to information regarding
a level of performance and/or the manner and efficiency in which performance processes have been
executed (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). In terms of its
ability to influence employee behavior, feedback
derives its motivating power almost exclusively
from the information it provides about an employee's performance, which, in turn, enhances role
clarity about a task to be performed (Bandura, 1986;
Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). However, in order to foster
role clarity, performance feedback needs to be: (1)
clearly delivered as an external intervention, (2)
conveyed in a positive manner, (3) immediate, and
(4) specific (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997).

The theoretical discussion so far implies the different natures of money, social recognition, and
feedback and, as a result, their potentially different
effects on performance. In suggesting that effects
differ, we also assume the importance of task and
domain specificity (Bandura, 1986). Such specificity is important because social cognitive theory is
based on the major premise that people act
uniquely and selectively in different domains and
under different situational demands (Bandura,
1986, 1997; Locke, 1997). Specifically, every action
is unique within a certain domain and does not
necessarily generalize to a variety of other domains,
nor do actions ever (unless in a vacuum) represent
decontextualized behaviors (Locke, 1997). Thus, as
also postulated in other research areas (self-efficacy,
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goal setting), we suggest that money, social recognition, and feedback represent context- and personspecific motivators that do not have exclusive reinforcing properties independent of the domain in
which they are implemented. Importantly, this
does not mean that the motivating powers of
money, social recognition, and feedback do not
generalize to different domains, but rather, that
they generalize differently for different employees,
tasks, and contexts.
Applying these arguments to the present study
generates further suggestions as to the betweengroup ordering of the magnitudes of the effects of
money, social recognition, and feedback. As the
following Methods section will outline in detail,
we selected a manufacturing organization for this
study because this type of setting is the most feasible for conducting a quasi experiment. The company selected offered multiple relatively equivalent groups and used objective performance
measures that allowed for less reliance on supervisors' subjective judgments of performance effectiveness. Thus, for our study's participants and organizational context, we suggest that money would
have the strongest effect on performance, followed
by social recognition, and then feedback.
In this setting, employees would probably perceive money as having a high instrumental value
and as worth extra effort, given the relatively low
wage rate. Social recognition, although not resulting in instant rewards, as did money, could be
perceived as indicating potential upcoming rewards, such as a pay raise or transfer to a better job
or to a more desired shift, rewards that would motivate further pursuit of behaviors that received
contingent social recognition. Finally, feedback
would have the weakest effect on performance for
two reasons. First, in contrast to social recognition,
which, in addition to its predictive powers, also
involves a form of feedback (albeit a nominal one),
performance feedback does not include any form of
explicit social recognition, and clearly does not
involve money. Second, given its informational nature, when feedback is provided for routine behaviors, that information, although beneficial, may not
be as useful to self-regulation, given the narrow
demands of the simple task studied here. Thus, we
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2. When all three incentive motivators are applied in the same way through the
O.B. Mod. model, money produces the strongest effect on performance, followed by social
recognition, and then by performance feedback.
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METHODS
Study Site
The study took place in the operations division
of a large company with over 7,000 employees in
one metropolitan area. To separate the monetary
from the other two interventions, we used two separate facilities, performing identical work, located
several miles apart. The operations division is responsible for processing and mailing credit card
bills for the organization's several hundred financial institution, retail, and "e-commerce" customers. This organization has been an industry leader
in objectively measuring performance. For this
study, we collected individual performance data,
recorded in real time by a meter at each employee's
workstation during both a baseline preintervention
and a postintervention month.
Intervention Groups and Study Participants
Work in this division was performed in shifts at
the two facilities, which permitted the formation of
four intact groups (N = 182). The four groups
(shifts) used in this study were: (1) routine pay for
performance (n = 50), (2) monetary incentives
(n = 43), (3) social recognition (n = 50), and (4)
performance feedback (n = 39). These groups were
comparable in terms of the workers who: (1) were
employed full-time in both the baseline and intervention months, (2) performed exactly the same
task, and (3) had, on the average, approximately the
same training, work experience, education (no college), demographic characteristics (average age was
26-38 years, gender was about evenly split, and
ethnicity was about 25 percent minorities), and
supervision (across the groups, supervisors' age,
tenure, gender, and supervisory experience in general and in the current unit were similar).
Procedures
Pertaining to our first hypothesis, the routinepay-for-performance group simply received supplemental pay for increased performance. This
shift's supervisors, who did not receive any behavioral management training, informed workers of
this intervention. In contrast, pertaining to our second hypothesis, the other three groups operated
under Luthans and Kreitner's (1985) five-step O.B.
Mod. model of behavioral management. The intervention procedures used replicated those used in
previous research (Luthans, Paul, & Baker, 1981;
Welsh, Luthans, & Sommer, 1993). Each groups'
managers and supervisors had an identical threehour O.B. Mod. training session conducted by the

2001

Stajkovic and Luthans

same researcher. The training received was identical, except as pertained to the type of intervention
(step 4) they were to use.
After being given a brief background on behavioral management, the supervisors were asked to
identify critical, observable,and measurablebehaviors that were currently deficient but had a high
potential for improving worker performance. The
supervisors were then trained in identifying the
antecedents and consequences of the identified
performance behaviors, knowledge of which they
then used as background for implementing their
specific intervention manipulation. The intervention stage represents the action step in O.B. Mod.
and was the treatment manipulation in this study.
Each group was separately trained in and implemented a different reward intervention to manage
the critical performancebehaviors previously identified. For the pay-for-performanceand monetary
incentive groups, the researchers, in conjunction
with management, developed the supplemental
pay plan.
Importantly,the supervisors in both the pay-forperformance and monetary incentive groups carefully communicated at the beginning of the intervention month the specifics of the plan to ensure
that the workers fully understood the payout. This
was all that was done in the pay-for-performance
group. The trained supervisors in the O.B. Mod.administered money group: also (1) discussed with
workers whether they viewed the payout for increased performance as meaningful and worth the
effort, (2) provided workers with ongoing help and
coaching about specifics of the program,and, most
importantly, (3) continuously throughout the intervention period reminded individual workers that
the monetary contingency consequence would be
forthcoming when the workers were engaged in the
critical performancebehaviors.
In the social recognition intervention group, the
trained supervisors administered personal recognition and attention contingent upon observing workers performing the specific behaviors identified in
step 1. Supervisors were explicitly instructed that
the social recognition and attention was not to be
sugary praise or a pat on the back. Rather, the
intention was to let the worker know that the supervisor knew that he or she was performing behaviors previously communicated as important to
performance. For example, the supervisor said
things such as, "When I was walking through your
area on my way to the front office this morning, I
saw you making a sequence check, that's what
we're really concentrating on." Finally, in the feedback intervention group, the supervisors developed
charts and other written and verbal objective (usu-
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ally quantitative) information concerning the frequency of the identified critical performance behaviors. For example, unlike supervisors in the
social recognition group, supervisors in the feedback group would chart the number-of sequence
checks made and communicate that to the workers
with no added personal comments.
Threats to Internal Validity

Since this study cannot be classified as a fully
randomized experiment but rather, as a quasi experiment, in which there was randomization of
groups to treatmentbut not of individuals to groups
(Cook&Campbell, 1979), we needed to analyze the
potential threats to internal validity. In particular,
selection artifacts appeared implausible, since the
baseline performance levels were not statistically
different. In this case, according to Cook and Campbell (1979), initial performance levels could be assumed to be equal. This assumption is especially
valid when analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is
also used to control for the initial performanceas a
covariate. Ambiguity about the direction of causal
effects was ruled out, since we only used external
interventions as treatments. The presence of the
same general environment and the occurrence of no
noteworthy events for all four groups prevented
any biasing impact of history effects. We controlled
for a local history effect by: (1) holding O.B. Mod.
procedures constant across the three groups, (2)
having the same researcher train all supervisors,
and (3) conducting the study for all groups in the
same, technically determined manufacturing layout. In addition, bias due to instrumentation differences can be ruled out since the same objective
performance measures derived from workstation
meters were used for each group. Nor could testing
be a source of bias, since questionnaires were not
used. We also designed our study to include only
participants that were present during both baseline
and intervention periods, thus effectively preventing the mortality effect. Regarding maturation, all
participants in our study had relatively similar experience and were engaged in a relatively short,
one-month intervention period that does not appear long enough for any meaningful personality or
knowledge changes to occur. Thus, all of the above
threats to internal validity were either ruled out or
minimized by the study design.
Among the threats to internal validity that our
design may not have deflected are resentful demoralization and compensatory rivalry. These would
also appear to have been minimized, since the two
groups that received money: (1) were in a different
facility several miles away from that of the two
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portance of systematic procedures when monetary
incentives are applied.

groups that received no money and (2) had neither
knowledge about, communication with, nor any
interaction with the other two groups, as reported
by the management and the workers themselves.
Most importantly, in the two money-receiving
groups, the observed effects on work performance
were significantly different (see below). Related to
these arguments, diffusion of treatment appears implausible given: (1) the different locations, (2) the
random presence of an on-site researcher, who verified that supervisors knew what they were to do
and that they clearly and continuously implemented the specifics of their assigned intervention,
and (3) the significantly different effect magnitudes
the interventions yielded. Safeguarding against
these latter threats ensured that the treatment
groups were not mutually equalized.

Monetary versus Nonfinancial Incentives
Since, for all three types of incentive motivators,
performance significantly increased from the baseline to the intervention month, we next examined
between-group differences in the effect magnitudes
of O.B. Mod.-administered money, social recognition, and feedback.
We conducted analysis of variance of posttreatment performance levels and found significant effect differences among the three incentive motivators (F = 4.28, p < .01). In particular, money had
the strongest effect on performance, followed by
social recognition and feedback. Analytical comparisons, using Tukey's post hoc test, revealed that
the differences in effects on performance were significant both for money and social reinforcement
and for money and feedback. Although in the hypothesized direction, the magnitude of the difference in the effects of social recognition and feedback did not reach statistical significance. These
findings largely supported Hypothesis 2.
Table 1 shows that the baseline performance levels of the groups under these three interventions
may have some nominal variations. Thus, we conducted an analysis of covariance, a procedure that
can account for the initial level of potential performance differences. Using baseline performance
level as a covariate, we first adjusted the estimates
by using the equation for one covariate (Pedhazur,
1982) and then examined the differences among the
performance levels after the treatment. As expected
in ANCOVA (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Pedhazur,
1982), standard deviations and standard errors decreased owing to the decrease in mean square residuals. As a result, the precision of analysis in-

RESULTS
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and complete
results pertaining to both hypotheses.
Monetary Incentives with and without
Systematic Application
Routine pay for performance increased performance over its baseline level 11 percent (t = 2.01,
p < .05), whereas money applied through the
systematic procedures of the O.B. Mod. model
increased performance 31.7 percent (t = 4.35, p <
.05). The between-group comparison between
money as routine pay for performance and the same
amount of money systematically provided through
the O.B. Mod. model revealed a significant difference in performance improvement (t = 1.80, p <
.05), with the O.B. group outperforming the routine
group by slightly over 20 percent. This finding
supported Hypothesis 1, clearly confirming the im-

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for all Interventionsa
Baseline
Performance
Intervention

n

O.B.
Mod.

Money
Money
Social
Feedback

50
43
50
39

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Performance after
Intervention

Adjusted
Valuesa

Mean

s.d.

Mean

s.d.

s.e.

s.d.

163,157
132,147
106,911
107,916

64,622
50,713
55,519
68,036

181,272
174,056
132,635
129,195

52,602
61,449
91,262
79,898

9,018
9,371
12,906
12,794

58,614
75,861
62,517

s.e.

After-Intervention
Mean minus
Baseline Mean

Performance
Improvement b

t

8,939
10,728
10,011

18,115
41,908
25,724
21,279

11
31.7
24
20

2.01*
4.35*
2.42*
2.04*

Adjusted for the covariate, baseline performance (F = 52.21, p < .01), after an ANCOVA for the three O.B. Mod. interventions (F =
21.39, p < .01).
b Percent
change.
Main-effect impact on performance.
* < .05
p
a
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creased, with the results for the postintervention
between-group performance differences (F = 6.02,
p < .01) and post hoc comparisons remaining the
same. These findings (7 = .29, q2 = .09; Hays,

1988), adjusted for the performance baseline covariate (F = 52.21, p < .01) after ANCOVAfor the
three O.B. Mod. interventions (F = 21.39, p < .01),
at least statistically alleviate the concern that performance differences may have been due to selection artifacts in different treatment groups.
DISCUSSION
By providing the theoretical rationale and empirically examining differences in the effects of routine pay for performanceand systematically administered (O.B. Mod.) money, social recognition, and
feedback, we hope to have initiated a change from
focusing on the general question of whether contingent incentives are related to performance to
examining more specific questions regarding the
nature, relative impacts, and mechanisms underlying the relationship between incentive motivators
and performance. These lines of research may further explain the contributionof incentive motivators
to work performanceby guiding the effortto develop
process-orientedanalysis of the contextual and cognitive differentiatingfactorsthat we proposed.
In this manufacturing setting, characterized by
well-defined, simple jobs and relatively low wages,
money was likely perceived as having a high instrumental value that was worth extra effort. Extra
effort, in turn, translated into increased performance, since there was no real need for increases in
knowledge, skill acquisition, strategydevelopment,
and self-efficacy. However, the finding of a significant difference between the effects on performance
of routine pay for performanceand the O.B. Mod.administered money clearly points to the importance of theory-based, systematic application procedures (Lawler, 1990; Pfeffer, 1995).
Regarding social recognition, the more workers
received it, the more likely they were to foresee it as
suggestive of some forthcoming desired tangible
outcome. Thus, although not resulting in an instant
material benefit, social recognition was likely perceived as a latent variable potentially indicating, in
this setting, a pay raise, a transferto a better job, or
a transferto a more desired shift. Cognitively bringing the anticipated future into the present by forethought in turn motivated workers to further pursue behaviors that received such social support
(Luthans&Stajkovic, 2000). However, although the
social environment has been conceptually recognized as playing an important role in human behavior, the use of social recognition as a specific
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intervention to improve work performance has
been seriously neglected, if not totally ignored. Our
results show that it can greatly improve performance and, unlike money, generate no direct financial costs.
Finally, feedback provided for simple and welldefined tasks may not be as useful to self-regulation
and subsequent motivation as it may be for tasks
with more role ambiguity. In addition, treatment
manipulation of feedback has always been a complex undertaking, likely contributing to the mixed
findings on feedback effects obtained over the years
(Kluger& DeNisi, 1996). For example, whereas social recognition by its nature involves some form of
feedback (an act of recognition itself), objective
(quantitative) performance feedback does not include any form of explicit social recognition and is
usually given when workers do not performcritical
behaviors. Yet, in both cases, information is communicated in a positive manner. These similarities
in social recognition and feedback may explain the
closeness in their effects on performance in this
study.
Future Theory Development
The important question for future theory development concerns the contextual conditions that
would further explain the differences in the effectiveness of the three incentive motivators under
different circumstances. We suggest that a key variable in this process may be task complexity. In fact,
given that tasks are an inherent part of any study of
work performance, task complexity has been analyzed as a moderatorin a number of areas in organizational behavior, such as self-efficacy (Stajkovic
& Luthans, 1998a), goal setting (Wood, Mento, &
Locke, 1987), and job design (Hackman& Oldham,
1980). The importance of task complexity is derived from the fact that different levels of task complexity have different implications for the behavioral, information-processing,and cognitive facilities
of the task performer.In particular, in comparison
to low task complexity, high task complexity places
greater demands on individuals' (1) required
knowledge, (2) skill capacity, (3) behavioral facility, (4) information processing, (5) persistence, and
(6) self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Stajkovic &
Luthans, 1998a; Wood, 1986).

Since, given these factors, complex tasks do not
lend themselves to easy appraisal or to easy execution, we suggest that the effect orderingof incentive
motivators for complex tasks found in professional
and managerial work settings would be different
from the ordering we found. In particular, we suggest that for complex tasks, feedback would have
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the strongest effects on work performance, followed by social recognition and then money.
Given its emphasis on informative content, feedback would appear to best provide the varied
information needed for the successful execution of
complex tasks, which are usually multifaceted.
Complex tasks also tend to be ambiguously defined
and may lack objective performance measures. As a
result, task performers may not fully understand
what they have to do and what means to use and
thus will lack accurate information conducive to
successful performance. Under these conditions,
the importance of clarifying role ambiguity as an
outcome utility of feedback appears critical for successful performance.
Social recognition derives its importance for the
performance of complex tasks from its effects on
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), which is, in turn, the
major predictor of work-related performance on
complex tasks (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998a). In this
case, social recognition is framed as verbal persuasion focused on enhancing task performers' beliefs
about what they can do with what they already
have (as opposed to persuasion focused on enhancing skill and ability, as would feedback) (Bandura,
1997; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998b). Expressing faith
in employees' ability to perform through social recognition is especially important when they face
novel tasks and when they have performance difficulties and, as a result, may be questioning their
personal efficacy.
High-complexity performance usually requires a
high educational level, which is typically associated with professional and managerial jobs, and, by
implication, high pay. It follows that money may
have less motivating potential if high pay is already
present, especially if it is perceived in its instrumental form. However, at higher levels of pay,
money is likely to take on symbolic properties and
may become an instrument of social comparison.
Regardless of the way it is perceived, money usually produces increased effort, which, on its own,
does not seem sufficient for the successful performance of a complex professional or managerial
task. High self-efficacy, congruent skills, task strategies, and a higher level of goals are also needed
(Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998a). In comparison to
money, these factors are more readily provided indirectly by social recognition through its impact on
self-efficacy and, most of the time, directly by feedback.
Future Research
Since the above theoretical suggestions have
been missing from the literature on incentive mo-

June

tivators, we suggest several interesting avenues for
future research. First, researchers could examine
the moderating impact of task complexity on the
relationship between incentive motivators and performance by varying the level of the complexity of
the task in each studied intervention and then testing the within-group effects and between-group differences. Next, to provide even greater insight, the
interventions could be examined in different combinations for different complexity levels. Finally,
the magnitude of each intervention could also be
specified on an ordinal level. Such research would
provide answers as to which incentive motivator or
combination, for which magnitude, produces the
greatest effect on performance for different levels of
task complexity.
Another, related, line of research might focus on
whether incentive motivators only entice workers
to mobilize greater effort or also lead to the development of more effective task strategies through
increased self-efficacy. Such development might
occur because different incentive motivators may
produce different effects, through improved performance, on self-efficacy. As Bandura (1997) put it, it
is not behavior that causes behavior, but what is
psychologically made out of it (see Stajkovic &
Summer, 2000). Finally, the level of task complexity may also determine if new task-related skills are
needed to successfully execute the intricate demands of complex tasks, or if enhancing self-efficacy with the same skill level would account for
the same variance.
Practical Implications
Providing empirically derived positive results by
using the best features of both the power of individual incentive motivators and O.B. Mod. procedures may benefit today's cost-conscious managers
in at least three ways. First, administering different
interventions through a theoretically based yet application-driven model such as the O.B. Mod.
model may provide a way to help overcome some
of the design and process issues associated with the
application of pay for performance and other incentive motivators, including social recognition and
feedback. Second, showing whether the effects of
different incentive motivators on work performance vary from each other and, if so, how much
they vary, can help the managers of today's organizations not only to meet the challenge of improving
performance, but also to reduce the cost or minimize the costs of doing so by choosing the most
effective incentives for given circumstances. Finally, this study showed that first-line supervisors
can be quickly trained in the steps of behavioral
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Steers, L. W. Porter, & G. A. Begley (Eds.), Motivation and leadership at work: 34-52. New York:
McGraw-Hill.

this era of renewed interest in gaining competitive
advantage through people, management scholars
are being challenged to make their theories and
research findings more understandable, practical,
and useful. This field study would seem to help
meet this challenge.

Lawler, E. E. 1990. Strategic pay. San Francisco: JosseyBass.
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